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 The terminus of the Cold War in Eastern Europe is 
often characterized by the fall of Communism and the rise of 
capitalist governments. This narrative is only half true when 
applied to Lithuania. Popular elections did occur peacefully 
with the transition to multiparty power. Democracy was 
successfully reintroduced, resulting in a new constitution. 
With democracy asserting itself, it may seem logical that 
economic reforms would as well. Despite being nicknamed 
a Baltic Tiger, due to rapid economic growth, it would not 
be accurate to describe Lithuania’s post-Soviet government 
as a capitalist democracy until the 21st century.85 Instead of 
supporting a privatized government, Lithuania’s first 
presidential election was used to elect the former Communist 
Party leader, Algirdas Brazauskas. Anatol Lieven, a 
journalist in Vilnius during the revolution, wrote about his 
experience in The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and the Path to Independence. Lieven argues that 
Lithuanian independence ended with “disintegration of the 
Soviet Union – as opposed to the end of Communism.”86  
 
 
 
85 “Baltic Tiger,” The Economist, July 19, 2003, 1. 
86 Anatol Lieven, The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and 
the Path to Independence (Yale Univ. Press, 2005), 274. 
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Within two years of declaring independence, the old 
regime was back in control of parliament and had 
implemented measures to curb free market policies. The ex-
Communists governed Lithuania as the Democratic Labor 
Party of Lithuania (LDDP) and remain politically influential 
in 2020. Five of the seven total parliamentary elections in 
Lithuania resulted in the LDDP coalition obtaining a ruling 
majority. Lithuania’s political spectrum has continuously 
swung between the free market-oriented Homeland Union 
(TS) and the LDDP which supported a interventionist 
approach to economics. Initially, in 1990, these two factions 
were united in advocating a full economic and political break 
from Russia and shift towards a free-market system. The first 
leader of Lithuania’s multiparty Parliament (Seimas), was 
Vytautas Landsbergis. Landsbergis was the head of a 
coalition comprised of ex-Communists, economic 
conservatives, and religious fundamentalists. Elections in 
1992 resulted in an overwhelming loss for Landsbergis’s 
coalition party, named The Movement (Sąjūdis).  
Why did Lithuania reject Sąjūdis in favor of the 
former Communist Party? Why has Lithuania supported 
different political ideologies instead of favoring one 
consistently? To answer these questions, another must first 
be addressed: what determines Lithuanian political 
activism? This paper will argue that Lithuanian political 
activism is the conjunction of three main factors: economic 
pragmatism, populist candidates, and a lack of strong 
ideological affiliation. These motivations were significant 
contributors to independence and continue to determine 
political and economic outcomes in Lithuania. 
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Moving Toward Democratic Elections 
After losing independence in 1940, the former 
Republic of Lithuania was governed by a single political 
party. This was the Communist Party of Lithuania (LKP), a 
puppet party of the Soviet Union. Because the party had such 
strong ties to Moscow, Lithuanian concerns came second to 
those of the Soviets. As long as the Soviet state remained 
strong, so did the LKP’s authority in Lithuania. Despite 
Moscow’s efforts to maintain stability and order, the Soviet 
state did not remain strong. Growing dissatisfaction with 
economic and political realities led to a rejection of the one-
party system by 1988. As a result, Soviet leaders were not 
seen as truly representative of the people they governed. The 
LKP responded to unrest by assigning the position of First 
Secretary to Algirdas Brazauskas, who advocated for reform. 
Despite this, political ambivalence and repression of the 
local will culminated in one of the largest demonstrations in 
human history, known as the Baltic Way.87 The protest was 
largely inspired by the 50-year anniversary of and opposition 
to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which illegally placed the 
Baltics under Soviet control in 1940.88 Shortly before the 
protests, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was revealed to be an 
illegitimate partition of territory, contributing to erosion of 
support for the Communist regime. 
 
87 Charles Woolfson, “‘Hard Times’ in Lithuania: Crisis and 
‘Discourses of Discontent’ in Post-Communist Society,” Ethnography 
(November, 2010): 488. 
88 The Baltic Way, also referred to as ‘Arms Across the Baltic’ or the 
‘Singing Revolution,’ was a mass demonstration that took place in 1989 
across Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia simultaneously. Over two million 
Balts participated in this peaceful protest, with the greatest number of 
participants in Lithuania.  
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Rejection of the LKP in 1989 increased populist 
sentiment in Lithuania against the Soviet Union. Responding 
to public discontent, The Academy of Sciences in Lithuania 
formed a commission to propose changes to the 
constitution.89 This led to a public meeting on June 3, 1988, 
at the Academy in Vilnius. At this public meeting, the 
institution’s proposals were drowned out by dozens of 
independently-minded faculty. Instead of reforming the 
current system, political autonomy was demanded. These 
activists at the Academy in Vilnius called themselves the 
Initiative Group, later known as the Movement (Sąjūdis). 
Many future politicians were present, politically united 
under Lithuania’s fist coalition party. Sąjūdis contained 
staunch Communists and free market conservatives and 
tended towards populism rather than anti-Communism. 
 Vytautas Landsbergis was among the professors 
who raised the initial call for non-Communist parties. His 
knowledge and use of ethnic poetry and literature inspired 
nationalist sentiments. Landsbergis was a cultural expert 
who used religious overtones to make profound and 
impactful speeches. As a musicologist, Landsbergis was 
perceived as detached from the Soviet bureaucracy, granting 
him credibility when speaking about Lithuanian autonomy. 
Having social ties in Kaunas and Vilnius, the largest centers 
of population, helped Landsbergis assume a prominent 
position within the Sąjūdis. Economic ruin may have 
brought crowds together, but leaders such as Landsbergis 
were capable of transforming them into an institutional 
force.  
 
 
89 Lieven, The Baltic Revolution, 224. 
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Sąjūdis organized a large rally to discuss proposing a 
mandate on June 24, 1988. Speakers at the event included 
the leadership of the future conservative party and socialist 
parties. Public activism for these events is reported on the 
Global Nonviolent Action Database page about the 
Lithuanians Campaign for National Independence 1988-
1991 and states that “20,000 people attended the second 
demonstration where they heard speeches by Vytautas 
Landsbergis (who would later become the leader of Sąjūdis) 
and Algirdas Brazauskas (a Communist Party leader).”90 
Brazauskas, speaking on behalf of Sąjūdis was a red herring, 
he would later run against the party and its free market 
agenda. In the initial stages of the revolution, conservatives 
and ex-Communists showed more willingness to forge a 
mutually beneficial path of compromise. The willingness to 
work together as a revolutionary coalition quickly became 
strained. Revolutionaries would later become rivals, 
splintering the country’s political spectrum. 
Sąjūdis in 1988 was more moderate and populist than 
it would be during the post-Soviet era. The ideological 
broadness of Sąjūdis constricted with the influx of 
nationalist members. Kaunas, the second largest city in 
Lithuania, quickly joined the nationalist discussion. The 
Kaunas faction brought more adamant calls against 
Communism and the existing bureaucracy to the Sąjūdis. 
Membership in Sąjūdis from outside the capital, as Lieven 
states, led directly to the “gradual takeover and 
radicalization by representatives from Kaunas.”91 In order to 
 
90 “Lithuanians Campaign for National Independence, 1988-1991,” 
Global Nonviolent Action Database, 1991. 
91 Lieven, The Baltic Revolution, 226. 
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maintain the coalition for independence, Landsbergis, 
himself originally from Kaunas, rose to represent both 
factions by 1990. In order to contain the Kaunas nationalists 
within Sąjūdis, Landsbergis became more extreme in his 
rhetoric, demanding a complete separation from the Soviet 
Union. This trend resulted in alienating many of those in 
Sąjūdis who desired moderation.  
The Baltic Way represented the crest of a tidal wave 
of populist expression. Sąjūdis was highly active in 
organizing the Baltic Way, collecting signatures and 
spreading information to the population. Organizing efforts 
were met with enthusiasm, and as time went on participation 
in demonstrations increased. The Lithuanian people clearly 
desired freedom from one-party Soviet rule. Populism was 
the defining political catalyst for change in 1989, and 
continues to define Lithuanian politics today. Populism in 
Lithuania defines populism as a style, not an ideology, 
meaning populism brought together individuals with 
differing political principles.92 The roughly two million 
participants in the Baltic Way were responding to nationalist 
sentiment that appealed to capitalists and Communists alike. 
The Baltic Way demonstration should be historically viewed 
as an expression against the Soviet concentration of power, 
not as an anti-socialism movement. Independence was the 
main political concern of the people, as is evident in this 
1991 survey asking: “‘Do you agree that the Lithuanian state 
should be an independent, democratic republic?’ About 85 
percent of eligible voters participated and 90 percent said 
 
92 Gintaras Aleknonis and Renata Matkevičienė, “Populism in 
Lithuania: Defining the Research Tradition,” Baltic Journal (2016): 30. 
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yes.”93 The level of activism the population showed toward 
political elections was significantly less. The role of Sąjūdis 
in the mass demonstrations of 1989 is uncontested, but the 
transition from protest movement to political party is more 
muddied. Popular voting for the newly independent 
parliament barely exceeded 50 percent participation, the 
minimum by law to count as an election. According to 
European Parties Elections and Referendums Network 
(EPERN), after the adoption of the 1992 Constitution came 
“a general decline in political activity by Lithuanian 
citizens.”94 Lithuanians were less interested in supporting 
political parties than gaining autonomy from the Soviet 
Union. 
 
Nationalist Direction 
After losing to Landsbergis for head of state in 1990, 
Brazauskas changed his stance on Lithuanian independence. 
According to an article put out by The Telegraph, 
Brazauskas initially “believed that the old USSR might be 
reconstituted as a looser federation of independent but still 
Communist states.”95 Reading into the popular sentiments of 
the people, Brazauskas continually changed his ideological 
position to stay politically viable. As the political 
atmosphere grew more factional, the centrist parties refused 
the idea of forming a coalition while Brazauskas expressed 
 
93 Richard Ebeling, “How Lithuania Helped Take Down The Soviet 
Union,” Capitalism Magazine 8 (Feb., 2016): 2; 
Liudas Mažylis, “Referendum Briefing No. 8: The Lithuanian EU 
Accession Referendum 10-11 May 2003,” Institute of Political Science 
and Diplomacy, Vytautas Magnus University, European Parties 
Elections and Referendums Network (Aug. 2003). 
95 “Algirdas Brazauskas,” The Telegraph, June 27, 2010, 1. 
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a desire for compromise.96 Reform to introduce independent 
political parties was something the LKP had recommended 
under Brazauskas’ leadership. Calls for full independence 
however, placed Sąjūdis and its leader Landsbergis, in 
ideological opposition to Brazauskas. By February 1990, the 
radical wing of Sąjūdis was intensely nationalist, demanded 
complete independence, and won on it.97 As Brazauskas took 
steps toward becoming a populist through promoting minor 
reform, Landsbergis’ persona became more ideologically 
hardline. Taking a hard stance brought victory in 1990, but 
would alienate Sąjūdis from the electorate in the long run.  
 Urged on by extremists in Sąjūdis, such as the 
Kaunas faction, Landsbergis’ insistence on immediate 
independence was less appealing to moderates in his party 
and Lithuania in general. Natalia Vekteriene resided in 
Lithuania during the political movement toward 
independence and she recalls hearing the news about Sąjūdis 
coming to power: “They would say ‘the new government is 
coming’ and that’s it, you just accept it. You see, we are not 
very political people. We, as citizens, just accept a new 
government. We did not know it was going to bring a new 
order.”98 Uncertainty about the new system by people like 
Vekteriene was shared by members within the Seimas.99 
 
96 Lieven, The Baltic Revolution, 270. 
97 Lieven, The Baltic Revolution, 233. 
98 Natalia Vekteriene, “Lithuanian Revolution,” interview by Scott 
Cichowlas, January 21, 2018. 
99 Five interviews were conducted by phone with Lithuanians who 
experienced the post-Soviet transition or grew up in its aftermath. 
Subjects were selected to allow for a diversity of perspective. 
Participants vary in age, gender, and socio-economic background. In 
2018, Greta Baltrusaityte was a 22-year-old student from Vilnius. She 
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Within three months of the declaration, Landsbergis was 
under pressure from his own party to place a moratorium on 
independence to improve strained Soviet relations. The 
reluctance to put the good of the economy over nationalist 
ideology further marginalized Sąjūdis from mainstream 
sentiments. Momentarily betraying his ideology, 
Landsbergis did capitulate to popular demands to improve 
Lithuania’s economic and international standing with the 
Soviet Union. A June 14, 1990 issue of The Chicago Tribune 
demonstrates the ideological shift by the head of state; 
“Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis has maintained 
that everything may be laid on the bargaining table except 
the declaration of independence. But on Wednesday - 
Landsbergis told parliament that ‘our side should think it 
over: how to do some maneuvering without inflicting 
damage on Lithuania and on the political path chosen by 
it.’”100 As negotiations with Russia failed to alleviate 
 
witnessed the ‘I Want To Work Here’ demonstrations and provides a 
millennial’s perspective on Lithuanian politics. Auguste Cichowlas is a 
22-year old expatriate from Lithuania. Auguste’s testimony helps to 
shed light on how the younger generation views the Lithuanian 
government. Auguste is my spouse and was invaluable in facilitating 
interviews with Lithuanian contacts. She also transcribed interviews 
conducted in Lithuanian into English. Jolanta Baltrusaitiene was in her 
early 20s when Lithuania became independent. Jolanta comes from a 
rural background, helping to counter the dominantly metropolitan 
narrative of the revolution. Natalia Vekteriene was attending high 
school in Vilnius during the revolution. Natalia’s experience helps to 
show how students were impacted. Thomas Vekteris, in his 20s when 
independence was declared, provides a firsthand account of how those 
in the capital endured the revolution. 
100 Thomas Shanker, “Soviets to Send Some Supplies to Lithuania,” 
Chicago Tribune, June 14, 1990. 
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economic and military threats, Landsbergis abandoned his 
cautious rhetoric and pivoted toward full independence in 
December 1990. Sąjūdis, under the leadership of 
Landsbergis, was ideologically opposed to compromise with 
the old regime. The rejection of moderate policies led to the 
party’s victory in 1990 and its loss of public support by 1992.  
 
Blockade and Occupation 
Military operations by Soviet forces commenced in 
the capital directly following the reinstatement of 
independence. Soviet tanks and troops occupied strategic 
points in the city, killing and wounding civilians. Popular 
outrage over Soviet atrocities turned into support for the new 
government. Tomas Vekteris was a student at Vilnius 
University during the military occupation of the city. He 
remembers that “at my University there was nobody 
campaigning, nobody was talking about it. Only after 
January 13th and 14th everybody started talking that people 
died and then everybody started expressing their feelings 
that something is happening and that we have to do 
something.”101 Another student at the time was Jolanta 
Baltrusaitiene. Baltrusaitiene joined the demonstrations to 
preserve the parliament building and recalls that “we were 
keeping guard by parliament, but only driven by solidarity 
to indicate that we really support our government and its 
leaders on their aspirations to resist and dissociate from 
Russia.”102 Popular support for the reborn republic was out 
 
101 Thomas Vekteris, “Lithuanian Revolution,” interview by Scott 
Cichowlas, January 21, 2018. 
102 Jolanta Baltrusaitiene, “Lithuanian Blockade,” interview by Scott 
Cichowlas, April 3, 2018. 
50                                                    Spring 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
of protest to Russian aggression, not ideological agreement 
with Landsbergis. 
 The Soviet Union’s blockade of Lithuania’s ports 
embargoed essential supplies into the country. This blockade 
was crippling to the burgeoning republic. Transforming the 
Lithuanian Economy, by Valdas Samonis, explains the 
dependent relationship between the Baltic economy and 
Soviet imports. Samonis notes that “Lithuanian agriculture 
was made heavily dependent on cheap mixed fodder, oil, and 
other inputs imported from Russia and other Soviet 
republics. The use of local inputs, except heavily 
underpriced labor, was limited to a minimum”.103 A New 
York Times article from 1990, Soviets Say Blockade of 
Lithuania Is Lifted, gives some sense of the social impact, 
describing how “hundreds of factories were closed, putting 
almost 50,000 people out of work.”104 Economic hardship in 
the transition towards independence was not only prevalent 
in the industrial sectors, but in rural areas as well. Jolanta 
Baltrusaitiene comments on her parents’ predicament 
outside of the city: “Those who lived in cities – had bigger 
food or fuel shortage, but since my parents are from the 
village – deprivation was more related to non-food products 
and money shortages.”105 Not only was employment and 
supply affected by sour relations with Russia, but 
commodity prices shot up forcing the Lithuanian Supreme 
 
103 Valdas Samonis, Transforming the Lithuanian Economy: from 
Moscow to Vilnius and from Plan to Market (CASE, 1995). 
104 “Soviets Say Blockade of Lithuania Is Lifted,” The New York Times, 
July 3, 1990. 
105 Baltrusaitiene, “Lithuanian Blockade.” 
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Council to introduce rationing.106 These extreme 
circumstances hindered the ability for the Sąjūdis 
government to implement privatization of the Lithuanian 
economy.  
 
Economic Dreams and Realities 
Popular support for independence was coupled with 
demands for economic autonomy. Inspiration for free market 
reforms came from prominent Lithuanian economists who 
joined Sąjūdis.107 By September 1988, Sąjūdis was 
promoting guidelines for dismantling the Communist 
system. These capitalist reforms were known as “The 
Blueprint for Lithuania’s Economic Independence,” or 
simply the “Blueprint.” The main directive of the Blueprint 
was to increase living standards by making the economy 
more efficient. The Blueprint rejected the old regime’s 
economic model of resource allocation in favor of cost-
benefit analysis. To create a decentralized market economy, 
the Blueprint called for the creation of a National Bank, 
along with a separate Lithuanian currency. Along with 
currency reform, state planning and price committees were 
to be abolished.108 The Blueprint called for radical and 
immediate implementation. Valdas Samonis states in 
Transforming the Lithuanian Economy, that “gradual 
economic reform is inadmissible, one cannot go step-by-
step.”109 Above all, the Blueprint sought to dissociate the 
 
106 Paul Goble, “25 Years Ago, Gorbachev's Economic Blockade Failed 
to Keep Lithuania in the USSR,” The Interpreter (April 19, 2015). 
107 Samonis, Transforming the Lithuanian Economy, 7. 
108 Samonis, Transforming the Lithuanian Economy, 10. 
109 Samonis, Transforming the Lithuanian Economy, 11. 
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Lithuanian market from that of the Soviet Union. Samonis 
claims that before the Blueprint was implemented, “90-95% 
of the Lithuanian economy was firmly controlled from 
Moscow.”110 Sąjūdis advocated for not only political 
separation from the Soviets, but economic separation as 
well. The pace and comprehensiveness of Sąjūdis’ economic 
reforms matched their extreme stance on independence. Just 
as the population initially supported Landsbergis’s 
nationalist extremism, they likewise upheld his economic 
plans out of protest to Soviet hegemony. 
                Three months before the Baltic Way 
demonstrations, the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet passed an 
adulterated version of Sąjūdis’ economic plan. The 
Communist regime under Brazauskas responded to demands 
for radical reform, showing a preference for populism over 
Communist ideology. Despite incorporating reforms from 
the Blueprint, Brazauskas desired slow and minor economic 
change. The final version of the law was heavily watered 
down, avoiding issues like the National Bank and currency. 
The version of the Blueprint that Brazauskas supported still 
gave preferential status to Moscow, failing to create a 
separate Lithuanian market. Lithuania’s natural resources 
were earmarked for Soviet purposes over national ones. 
Most significantly, Brazauskas’s path of minor reform 
helped to preserve the relationship between central 
economic planning and enterprises.111 Far from economic 
independence or free markets, the Communist form of the 
Blueprint did not go far enough to win over the populist 
surge of activism occurring across the country. 
 
110 Samonis, Transforming the Lithuanian Economy, 8. 
111 Samonis, Transforming the Lithuanian Economy, 9. 
Madison Historical Review                                              53 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dissatisfaction with the pace of economic change was a 
leading factor for Brazauskas’s electoral defeat in 1990. 
The promises of higher living standards through 
privatization won populist support for economic reforms. 
Once Sąjūdis was put into power, however, the ideology of 
privatization lacked the mass support it had held in 1990. 
Jolanta Baltrusaitiene remembers when privatization was 
introduced: “We were hurt pretty bad economically. I can say 
that the majority of provincial people who were less 
economically educated lost their jobs after the privatization. 
After the collective farms were torn up, they were not 
satisfied with free Lithuania.”112 Gediminas Cerniauskas 
published Emerging Market Economy in Lithuania, which 
tracks Lithuanian economic reformation from controlled 
economy to a free market. Cerniauskas defines the years 
1990-1994 as the “initial transition period for Lithuanian, 
which – witnessed a 43.86 percent fall in real [Gross 
Domestic Product] GDP and 318 percent annual 
inflation.”113 With such an extensive recession, 
Baltrusaitiene’s testimony is hardly unique to the provincial 
region. Natalia Vekteriene experienced the initial transition 
period from the capital: “It was complete turmoil, factories 
shut down, no one was producing anything because a lot of 
the factories were making things for the army.”114 This 
statement is supported by Cerniauskas’s analysis that the free 
government of Lithuania made the decision to drastically 
 
112 Baltrusaitiene, “Lithuanian Blockade.” 
113 Gediminas Černiauskas and Algis Dobravolskas, “Emerging of 
Market Economy in Lithuania (1990-2010),” Intellectual Economics 
(Mykolas Romeris University, 2011): 375. 
114 Vekteriene, “Lithuanian Revolution.” 
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reduce production of military goods, negatively impacting 
GDP.115 By September 1991, Russia had recognized 
Lithuania’s independence, but economic conditions were 
slow to improve in the Baltic state. Instead of ushering in a 
free market economy, which was an ideological priority for 
Sąjūdis, the conservative government had initiated price 
controls and vouchers. Natalia Vekteriene recalls that, “the 
stores were as empty as before, but now you also have 
vouchers. Queues and queues of people, everybody would 
stand in lines, just like before.”116 Between 1990 and 1992, 
Lithuania’s real GDP had plummeted nearly 50 percent.117 
Despite Sąjūdis’ long-term policies of privatization and 
competitive markets for Lithuania, full implementation of a 
free market was not achieved. Due to the abrupt reforms, 
coupled with a Russian embargo, Lithuania experienced an 
economic crisis. On the eve of the 1992 election, public 
demands to halt reforms intensified. Sąjūdis was unable to 
achieve its economic goals and was subsequently voted out 
of power. According to The National Archive for Parliament 
Election Results for Lithuania, the 1992 elections should be 
read as the result of “popular anger about the economic 
crisis, in particular the fuel shortage since Russia, the main 
supplier, had cut off imports.”118 The rise of Lithuania’s free 
market was incomplete after independence, despite the 
reform party controlling the government from 1990-1992. 
After taking initial steps to privatize the market, Lithuanians 
 
115 Černiauskas and Dobravolskas, “Emerging of Market,” 375. 
116 Vekteriene, “Lithuanian Revolution.” 
117 Černiauskas and Dobravolskas, “Emerging of Market.” 
118 “Lithuania: Parliamentary Elections Seimas, 1992,” Historical 
Archives of Parliamentary Election Results for Lithuania, 1992. 
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rejected the conservatives in favor of a more populist 
economic path.   
 
Return to the Old Regime  
A moderate stance on breaking from Russia had 
initially lost Brazauskas his chairmanship of the Seimas, but 
when parliamentary elections were held in 1992, his party of 
ex-Communists easily won the first round of voting. Had 
Lithuania resolutely voted freely and fairly for the old 
regime? There were many similarities between the 
Democratic Labor Party of Lithuania (LDDP) and the 
Communist Party of Lithuania (LKP), suggesting a vote for 
the LDDP was a vindication of the LKP. Brazauskas was the 
head of the LKP just prior to its dissolution and resurrection 
in the form of the LDDP. Both the LKP and LDDP urged 
maintenance of close international ties with Russia. A policy 
of gradual independence had been favored by the LKP and 
LDDP. The LDDP promoted far left socialism, resembling 
traditional Communist governance instead of free markets 
and privatization. As president, Brazauskas chose his staff 
exclusively from the LDDP. Ausra Park wrote Post-
Communist Leadership: A Case Study of Lithuania’s ‘White 
House’ 1993-2014, detailing the policies of various post-
Soviet administrations. Park remarks that “such an attitude 
indicated a tendency to avoid openness and keep many 
matters secret – suggesting that the presidential office under 
Brazauskas was built on a model reminiscent of the Soviet 
Politburo.”119 Despite ideological ties to the old regime, the 
 
119 Ausra Park, “Post-Communist Leadership: A Case Study of 
Lithuania's ‘White House’ (1993–2014),” Demokratizatsiya: The 
Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Institute for European, 
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LDDP coming to power was less a vindication of Soviet rule 
and more of a populist backlash to poor economic conditions 
and Landsbergis’s decreased popularity.  
Evidence that Lithuanians were not enthusiastic 
about a ‘new man’ in government is the election of July 
1992, when the first popular vote was definitively in support 
for the former Communists, and against Landsbergis.120 
Adherence to nationalist rhetoric cost Landsbergis, and his 
party, the presidency, and parliament. Tomas Vekteris 
comments that “probably more people voted against 
Landsbergis than for Brazauskas.”121 Landsbergis, as Lieven 
explains in The Baltic Revolution, “misjudged the temper of 
his own people. He failed altogether to appreciate their dour 
underlying pragmatism.”122 Insight into the temperament of 
Lithuanians toward Landsbergis can be found in Tomas 
Vekteris’s interview; Landsbergis’s message was “to cut off 
all the ties with Russia, start from zero, destroy everything. 
No compromise, he wants to limit people’s choices. Even 
now a simple citizen understands the political life a bit 
differently, they see it through their own economic status. If 
it is profitable for you to have business relations with Russia, 
then they would much rather keep the business going and 
live well.”123 Instead of trying to rule with the ex-
Communists within a coalition government, Lieven claims 
that Landsbergis “left the nation more divided than when he 
 
Russian, and Eurasian Studies (George Washington University, June 5, 
2015), 160. 
120 Lieven, The Baltic Revolution, 218. 
121 Vekteris, “Lithuanian Revolution.” 
122 Lieven, The Baltic Revolution, 273. 
123 Vekteris, “Lithuanian Revolution.” 
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became its leader.”124 Landsbergis failed to tap into populist 
sentiments after Lithuanian independence, causing the 
LDDP to be the more appealing choice in 1992.  
One factor for the lack of support Landsbergis 
received, was due to religiously-based nationalism. Notions 
of divine justice were touted at the expense of economic 
pragmatism. According to a Chicago Tribune issue from 
September 4th 1990, “eighty percent of Lithuania’s 3.6 
million people call themselves Catholics.”125 Politically, it 
would seem wise to appeal to religious ideology in such a 
monotheist nation. Unfortunately for Landsbergis, religion 
in Lithuania was more divisive than uniting. The decades of 
anti-religious Communist rule had created suspicion 
throughout the population with regards to religious 
expression. Natalia recalls her family’s sentiments toward 
Catholicism under Soviet governance: “There was no 
official religion, but my grandma was still going to church. 
My mom was so embarrassed that her mother was religious, 
it was embarrassing to face the neighbors but you were also 
scared to get caught - you were not allowed to talk about it 
or tell people.”126 Although most Lithuanians did have some 
connection to the Catholic faith, it did not translate into 
political allegiance. Identifying as Catholic should be read in 
Lithuania’s case, as identifying with tradition as opposed to 
religious ideology. Landsbergis was more concerned with 
ideology than political pragmatism, serving to alienate 
moderates within the population.  
 
124 Lieven, The Baltic Revolution, 274. 
125 Michael Hirsley, “In Lithuania, Cardinal Finds A Lasting Faith,” 
Chicago Tribune, September 4, 1990. 
126 Vekteriene, “Lithuanian Revolution.” 
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Brazauskas took steps to move Lithuania away from 
a competitive market economy. Lieven points out that with 
the ex-Communists in control, Brazauskas reinforced “the 
growth of unhealthily-close links between ex-Communist 
business and ex-Communist bureaucracy and government, 
or ‘crony capitalism.’”127 Samonis backs up Lieven’s claim 
that the Soviet system returned under Brazauskas. He writes 
that “the new post-Communist government quickly resorted 
to old bad habits of inflationary wage increases, reversing 
some of the effects of the earlier income policies.”128 The 
LDDP politicized the economic market. Detrimental to the 
Sąjūdis’ Blueprint, the LDDP subsidized businesses, enacted 
protectionist policies on imports, and created a currency 
board to undermine the National Bank. Samonis points out 
that these policies served to “unnecessarily politicize the 
whole process of economic transformation.”129 The fiscal 
interventionism that the ex-Communists enacted should be 
seen as adhering to populist pressures for economic relief as 
well as an ideological adherence to a command economy. 
From 1992, deficit spending increased thanks to the LDDP’s 
economic policy. As Samonis puts it, depleting the county’s 
currency reserves was “aimed at propping up consumption 
levels in the known populist tradition.”130 In contrast to the 
goals of the Blueprint, Lithuania moved toward a corporatist 
system under Brazauskas. 
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Free Market Government Returns to Power 
Public support for Brazauskas and the LDDP waned 
as the economy continued to falter. LDDP policies 
negatively impacted Lithuania’s workforce, increasing 
unemployment rates. By interfering with the National Bank, 
Brazauskas helped to create a recession by the mid-1990s. 
As voters were scheduled to return to the poll booths in 1996, 
Brazauskas’s approval rate sharply declined. According to 
the Historical Archive of Parliamentary Election Results for 
Lithuania, in the 1996 Seimas elections: “The economy was 
at the forefront of campaign debate, as four years earlier 
when LDDP had won out on the same basis.”131 Sąjūdis had 
broken apart into differing conservative parties, with the 
most prominent being the Homeland Union. Landsbergis 
had formed this second coalition party out of the ashes of his 
political defeat in 1992. Popular opinion had swung back 
toward the conservative free marketers as ex-Communists 
gained a reputation for inhibiting growth. As the Historical 
Archive notes, the LDDP “was criticized for the country's 
economic stagnation and had been plagued by financial 
scandals.”132 Lithuanians were not willing to adhere to the 
ideology of command economy through thick and thin, and 
they shifted support to the Homeland Union in 1996. This 
politically polar switch was due to economic pragmatism. 
Landsbergis promised Lithuanians prosperity through 
European Union (EU) membership and increasing ties to the 
West. Economic pragmatism has been the driving force 
concerning the transfer of power since independence. 
 
131 “Lithuania Parliamentary Chamber: Seimas,” Historical Archive 
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Ideological attachment to the party was insignificant 
compared to the promise of prosperity.  
The shift from a Soviet model of bureaucracy was 
accelerated with the ascension of Lithuania’s second 
president, Valdas Adamkus. During the Brazauskas 
presidency, reinforcement of the Soviet model of state 
resulted in a dichotomy between the presidency and the 
Seimas. Not until the presidential election of 1998, did the 
Soviet model completely lose out to free market governance. 
Valdas Adamkus ran as an independent, allowing him to 
obtain votes from moderates within the socialist LDDP and 
conservative Homeland Union. Park notes that “the 
electorate was looking for a high-impact, change-oriented 
leader.”133 By running unaligned, Adamkus was successful 
in projecting himself as a populist rather than an ideological 
candidate. Despite running as an independent, Adamkus had 
strong notions that economic growth would be obtained 
through membership into the EU. By focusing on economic 
reforms that conformed with EU guidelines for membership, 
not only did Adamkus spread a populist message of making 
things better for everyone, he implemented substantial free 
market changes to the system. The article Post-Soviet 
Transformation of Bureaucracy in Lithuania, by Saulius 
Pivoras, discusses the dismantling of the Communist 
bureaucratic structure. Pivoras comments on the structural 
change of government after Brazauskas: “The model 
selected was Weberian, which presupposes a strict division 
between the spheres of politics and administration. The 
major motive for selecting this model was the effort to 
 
133 Park, “Post-Communist Leadership,” 163. 
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abolish the practice of Soviet administration.”134 The 
presidential election of 1998 was a rejection of the Soviet 
system for its poor economic performance. Populist 
sentiments in Lithuania shifted away from the east-looking 
LDDP and towards westward-looking Adamkus. Park 
writes: “Many voters took a favorable view of him and 
hoped that with his half-century in America, he would bring 
a fresh, totally non-Soviet approach to government.”135 
Valdas Adamkus had lived in the United States since 1949, 
easily winning the expatriate vote. His populist message for 
closer ties to the West convinced domestic Lithuanians that 
he was truly a vote for change. Populist messaging coupled 
with economic dissatisfaction once again aroused political 
activism to reject whatever ideology belonged to the status 
quo.  
 
Continuity of Populist Activism and Economic Protest 
Political activism in post-Soviet Lithuania is 
routinely unleashed by weak economic performance. The 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union had financially 
mismanaged its satellites. By the 1970s, Lithuanians were 
becoming politically active, as shown in the article, Self-
Immolations and National Protest in Lithuania. Political 
demonstrations erupted in the late 1980s, but had occurred 
previously in 1972 when riots in Kaunas broke out. Tomas 
Remeikis is a researcher whose focus is Lithuanian 
resistance to Soviet rule. Remeikis claims that “the attack on 
 
134 Saulius Pivoras, “Post-Soviet Transformation of Bureaucracy in 
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economic policy indicates that perhaps we are witnessing 
what has been called ‘a revolution of rising 
expectations.’”136 Economic dissatisfaction progressed into 
political activism by the 1980s. Samonis reiterates this point, 
claiming “economic sovereignty meant something less than 
independence in the beginning – during 1988 however, these 
terms converged.”137 In the post-Soviet era, economic 
demonstrations have continued to occur. This tendency to 
take to the streets over economic dissatisfaction supports the 
claim that economic performance motivates political 
activism. In 2009, economic demonstrations in Vilnius 
turned violent. The New York Times described the scene in 
the capital; “A group of 7,000 gathered to protest planned 
economic austerity measures. A small group began throwing 
eggs and stones through the windows of government 
buildings until the police moved in, using tear gas and rubber 
bullets.”138 Lithuania’s 2009 election appointed an 
independent economist by popular vote. Again, candidates 
promising prosperity trumped party allegiances.  
Economic conditions in Lithuania have continued to 
be a point of political contention past the 2009 global 
recession. In 2018, Lithuania experienced a protest 
movement focused on economic issues. The ‘I Want To 
Work Here’ movement was a reaction to the exodus of job-
seeking Lithuanians. Poor job opportunities in the country 
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inspired protests just a year after the 2017 parliamentary 
election, showing discontent for the new government’s 
economic policies. Auguste Cichowlas is a Lithuanian 
expatriate living in the United States. The recent socialist 
victory in the Seimas has come as an upset to Cichowlas: 
“The political perspective that the peasant party holds is not 
capitalist enough, they focus on agricultural growth and that 
is not what Lithuania needs at the moment.”139 Many 
Lithuanians feel their country needs to take a new political 
direction based largely on improving the domestic economy. 
Greta Baltrusaityte resides in Vilnius, and although she did 
not take part in the recent economic demonstrations she is 
upset with the country’s ruling socialist party. Greta claims 
the Peasant and Greens Union “…is a total disaster, they 
keep doing reforms and they are terribly corrupt.”140 
Dissatisfaction with economic reform and performance 
remains a poignant factor for supporting the status quo. 
Economic mismanagement recurrently motivates political 
activism in Lithuania’s past and present. 
 
Conclusion 
 The Lithuanian government is not a product of 
people’s ideological convictions but a result of economic 
populism. When the economy fails to benefit the lay person, 
Lithuanians take to the streets and the ballot box. Because of 
the strong desire for economic pragmatism over ideology, 
political parties with diverse ideologies have alternated after 
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independence. The popular shifts in party support 
demonstrates a weak affiliation between the people and 
ideological political platforms. The 1992 backing of the ex-
Communist LDDP was a vote for change, not for business as 
usual. Business as usual is what Lithuania got however, 
under the Brazauskas presidency. When the LDDP failed to 
bring economic prosperity, Lithuanians once again 
supported Landsbergis for his message of change. In 1998, 
Lithuanians threw their support behind the Western-oriented 
Valdas Adamkus. Running unaligned, Adamkus benefited 
from the weak ideological ties Lithuanians have with 
political parties. Lithuania was admitted into the EU shortly 
after the turn of the century. Admittance marks the point 
where Lithuanian government and markets had obtained a 
level of separation worthy of being called a free market. The 
traditional narrative of Lithuania as a capitalist Baltic Tiger 
should be applied to the 21st century as opposed to the years 
immediately following independence. Populist demands for 
economic pragmatism over ideology led the country toward 
a competitive market. Candidates promising superior 
economic results routinely garner populist support at the 
ballot. Populism, economic pragmatism, and weak 
ideological affiliation continues to drive Lithuanian 
activism. This activism can and has been used to support ex-
Communists as well as free market conservatives. As the 
LDDP and other socialist parties periodically resurge in the 
ranks of parliament, it would be wise to read such trends as 
dissatisfaction with the status quo and not be misread as the 
desire for a return to the former Soviet system.  
 
 
